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Abstract
We study how a buyer unable to price discriminate should satisfy his demand in
the presence of diseconomies of scale in production. Defying the Coase Conjecture,
we show that auctioning contracts for lots (block sourcing) followed by setting a
price to realize (part of) the residual gains from trade always leads to higher buyer
surplus than simply setting a price.
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1 Introduction
Monopsony (monopoly)1 is one of the fundamental settings in economics. We all know
that, as the monopsonist cares about his payments to the suppliers, not about the actual
production costs, he o¤ers an ine¢ ciently low price, leading to unrealized gains from
trade. This raises the question: why does he not open a residual market and try to
capture some of the residual surplus? The answer is provided by the so called Coase
Conjecture(Coase, 1972): since the price in the residual market would have to be higher
than the original price  as all supply at the original price has been exhausted  the
suppliers would prefer to wait for that price rather than selling for the original one, and
thus the (frictionless) market would unravel. Consequently, a residual market would be of
no use, thereby rationalizing the timeless nature of the institution of monopsony pricing,
which includes a commitment to the price o¤ered.
We revisit this classic problem and argue that the monopsonist can do better than
committing to a price, even if price discrimination is not possible. To do so, we consider
a buyer of a divisible homogeneous good facing a nite number of identical suppliers who
have increasing marginal costs2 of production. This set-up is compatible with the classic
one which only posits a supply function  but species the market structure in a realistic
manner. The buyers default option is classic monopsony: to purchase his requirements
from the suppliers via setting a price per unit at which he is willing to buy from any seller.
This will result in each seller supplying the quantity at which their marginal cost reaches
the price.
In many practical situations the monopsonist does his purchases in two stages. For
example, a residential gas supplier3 will typically buy a large part of its requirements
1The two models are technically equivalent. For concreteness, we tell our story in terms of a monop-
sony.
2This should not be seen as restrictive: constant marginal costs are just the knife-edge case between
a natural monopoly and a market where multiple rms can operate. Note that in monopoly the cor-
responding assumption would be equally natural: that buyers have decreasing marginal willingness to
pay.
3Alternatively, a tour operator looking for hotel rooms for its clients, or a produce wholesaler sourcing
from many growers, etc.
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forward, supplemented by later spot purchases. Of course, an important motivation there
is risk management  absent in our analysis  but our point is that there are more
fundamental reasons for going beyond the classical method.
As a rst step, let us consider an alternative to setting a price: setting a quantity.4
The monopsonist could decide on the quantity he wants to purchase in the market and
let the suppliers compete for the right to supply. Short of an invisible hand, we need
to posit a microstructure to predict how such a market would clear. For example, as
shown by Burguet and Sákovics (2017), if quantity setting is implemented by the suppliers
bidding for each innitesimal unit of demand, the outcome for any quantity set will be a
competitiveequilibrium, where the suppliers are paid their marginal cost and the market
clears. Given that, the buyers optimal choice of quantity is the classical monopsony
quantity and thus the auction leads to the same buyer surplus as setting the monopsony
price. Out of the frying pan, into the re: seemingly, switching to quantities is not the
answer. Or is it?
From the buyers point of view, the above auction has the unwanted feature that each
supplier makes her (positive)5 competitive prot. Consequently, he is interested in in-
creasing the competition among the suppliers in order to capture some of this surplus.
The buyer can achieve this by rationing some supplier(s): grouping together his require-
ments into sole-sourced lots (blocks) at least one fewer than the number of suppliers 
and auctioning them. We call this buying method block sourcing. Block sourcing trades
o¤ lower supplier prots against ine¢ cient allocation of production, as with increasing
marginal costs it is ine¢ cient to leave a supplier out of production. Can it improve on
monopsony prots? Let us work out an example.
Example 1 Let the buyers utility be given by U(Q) = Q   Q2
2
, leading to a demand
function of U 0(Q) = 1 Q; let there be two suppliers with identical cost functions c(q) = qa
a
.
We will calculate at two values, a = 3 and a = 1:5, here.6
4Just as in the classic problem, the buyer cannot set both prices and quantities for any supplier.
5Recall that with increasing marginal costs, price equal marginal cost implies positive prots for the
suppliers.
6In the rest of the examples, we will use a = 2 what simplies calculations. In this example, when
3
The classical monopsony quantity, Qm, is the solution to argmaxU(Q)   c0(Q=2)Q,
leading to the rst-order condition
U 0(Q) = c0(Q=2) +
Qc00(Q=2)
2
: (1)
Substituting in, we obtain that Qm(a = 3) = 2=3 or Qm(a = 1:5)  :3619, the monopsony
price is pm(a = 3) = 1=9 or pm(a = 1:5)  :4253, buyer surplus is BSm(a = 3)  :3704
or BSm(a = 1:5)  :1425. Supplier prots are m(a = 3) = 2=81  0:02469 or m(a =
1:5)  :02564, leading to utilitarian welfare Wm(a = 3)  :4198 or Wm(a = 1:5)  :1938.
With block sourcing, the optimal lot size, z, is the solution to
U 0(z) = c0(z); (2)
as the suppliers compete away all their prot, so the buyer only has to pay for the cost
of production. Substituting in, we obtain that z(a = 3)  :6180 or z(a = 1:5)  :3820,
and buyer surplus is BSbs(a = 3) = W bs(a = 3)  :3484 < :3704  BSm(a = 3), while
BSbs(a = 1:5) = W bs(a = 1:5)  :1516 > :1425  BSm(a = 1:5).
Thus, block sourcing indeed may outperform monopsony, but need not do so.7 The
logic of the result is simple: the ine¢ ciency caused by leaving out a supplier is increasing in
the convexity of the cost function, a. Meanwhile, the supplier prots in classic monopsony
are inverted U-shaped in a: they are small when a is either small (close to one) or large
and sizable in between. Nonetheless, we do not pursue a full characterization, as block
sourcing on its own turns out not to be the best the buyer can do.
Our key insight is that, unlike in the case of price setting, following block sourcing
there is room for a residual market. Note that block sourcing separates the suppliers into
two groups: winners and losers. Importantly, as they have already committed to produce
the lot they have won, in the residual market the winners have higher marginal costs than
the losers. As a result, the buyer can set a residual market price that is lower (recall
that, in the Coasian set-up above, it had to be higher) than the per-unit price paid to the
a = 2 both methods lead to the same buyer surplus: the ine¢ ciency loss equals the gain from eliminating
supplier prot.
7This ts with the emprical evidence that block sourcing is often but not universally used.
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winners so that they are not tempted to give up on the lot auction and still be able to
buy from the losers. Of course, the reopening of the market does reduce the intensity of
competition in the auction, but as we show in the remainder of the paper the optimal
policy of block sourcing followed by setting a price in the residual market always (that is,
for any number of suppliers, and well-behaved utility and cost functions) leads to strictly
higher buyer surplus than classic monopsony.
The competitive pressure facing the suppliers is largely determined by the lot policy
chosen. How keen a supplier is to obtain a block contract depends on her outside option.
This outside option is actually an inside option in our model: it is determined by what
prot she can expect to make in the residual market. The size of the residual market is
endogenous: the more demand is satised through lots, the less residual demand there is.
By setting larger lots, the buyer can squeeze the losing suppliers production and, there-
fore, prot in the residual market. As this makes the biddersinside option worse, they
bid more aggressively for the block contracts, in the aggregate more than compensating
the buyer for the concomitant ine¢ ciency. Importantly in the absence of xed costs 
this e¤ect does not lead to the complete elimination of the residual market: all suppliers
produce in equilibrium.
Our result holds whether or not the monopsonist is able to commit to the residual
market price before the auction. A lack of commitment power implies that he is bound
to set the monopsony price corresponding to the residual supply and demand, which is
higher than the price he would prefer to set taking into account its e¤ect on the bidding
behavior in the auction. Nevertheless, he still improves his payo¤ over classic monopsony.
The welfare e¤ects are in general indeterminate, as in most cases our method increases
the traded quantity towards the e¢ cient level but this is counteracted by the ine¢ cient
allocation of production: the lot winners produce too much and the loser too little.
Finally, we investigate the case when the supplierscosts are not identical. We establish
that asymmetry in costs reduces the e¤ectiveness of block sourcing, but our results are
robust to moderate asymmetry.
We carry out our analysis under complete information, in the spirit of the classic
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monopsony. Not only is this a reasonable assumption for many applications tour oper-
ators know the cost functions of the hotel chains they work with but it simplies and
focuses the analysis. Moreover, we can a¤ord to forgo the presence of informational rents,
as they are not necessary in our model to give prots to the suppliers. Thus, we are not
conducting a typical mechanism design exercise here (for that, see, for example, Maskin
and Riley, 2000). Rather, we try to uncover robust insights while analyzing the usefulness
of combining some standard practices. It is important to observe that with asymmetric
information auctions would play a key additional role: to select the most e¢ cient suppli-
ers. We show that even without this function they are useful, especially when combined
with a residual market.
2 The model
Consider n > 1 identical suppliers producing an innitely divisible homogeneous good
with a strictly increasing, strictly convex and thrice di¤erentiable cost function c (x),
with c(0) = 0.8 There is a single buyer, B, with a twice continuously di¤erentiable,
quasi-linear vNM utility function, V (x; $) = U(x) + $, with U 0(x) > 0, U 00(x) < 0 for
x 2 [0; 1], with the normalization U 0(1) = 0. The cost and utility functions are common
knowledge. We study the following two-stage procurement game: First, B announces
m 2 f0; 1; :::; n 1g contracts for (indivisible) lot sizes z1  :::  zm, where
mX
i=1
zi = Z  1.
Next, these contracts are sequentially auctioned, in decreasing order of size.9 To simplify
the assignment of lots among suppliers (who make the same bids in equilibrium), we
assume that as standard in actual multi-sourcing arrangements each supplier can win
at most one block contract. Following the lot auctions, each supplier can make further
sales in the residual market at (unit)price pr chosen by B we will analyze the cases where
B commits to this price before (strong commitment) or after (weak commitment) the lot
8To ensure that second-order conditions for optimality are globally satised in classical monopsony,
we also assume that c000(x)x+ 2c00(x) > 0 for x 2 [0; 1].
9Given complete information, the exact format of the auctions does not matter, even sequentiality we
only assume for simplicity.
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auction, separately. Note that not setting any lot corresponds to classical monopsony
pricing.
3 Results
Our rst observation is that since all suppliers are identical  in equilibrium it must
be the case that a seller who does not win a lot earns the same prot as any of the lot
winners.10 Basically, the auction and the residual market serve as inside options for the
suppliers, enforcing indi¤erence in equilibrium. Let z = (z1; :::; zm). Denote the prots of
each supplier that only sells in the residual market by  (z) = prc0 1(pr)  c (c0 1(pr)).
Lemma 1 Given any feasible z, the equilibrium prot of each supplier is equal to  (z).
Proof. Let the equilibrium prot of the winner of lot m   k +1 be denoted by (k)w .
Induction hypothesis (IH): If there are k lots left then (k)w =  (z) :
Step 1: The IH holds when k = 1. Since m < n there are n m+1  2 remaining
suppliers. It is immediate that in equilibrium neither (1)w >  (z) nor 
(1)
w <  (z). In
the rst case any losing bidder could do better by bidding slightly below the winners
bid (which must have been the (weakly) lowest), whereas in the second case the winner
could increase her prots by increasing her o¤er in order to lose. The latter argument
presupposes that there is another valid bid for the lot in equilibrium so that she indeed
loses the auction and so that the number of suppliers in the residual market, and thus pr,
remain the same. But, if there were no other bid, the winner could increase her o¤er and
still win, contradicting that we were in an equilibrium to start with.
Step 2: If the IH holds for k then it is also true for k + 1. By the IH, all the
suppliers who do not win lot m   k will earn  (z). Thus, the argument used in Step 1
can be directly applied to show that (k+1)w =  (z).
10Of course, this observation does not hold for all symmetric games with identical players, but it holds
in our game as shown in the proof of Lemma 1.
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This result points to the important linkage between the lot auction and the residual
market. The lemma implies that  conditional on the lot sizes  the market for the
residual demand determines the bids in the lot auction and, therefore, all the payo¤s.
This interconnection is what the buyer exploits when setting his lot policy.
Our next observation is that the buyers optimal policy does not have all suppliers
participating in the residual market. He sets lots in a way that the lot winners are
e¤ectively priced out of the residual market due to their high (interim) marginal costs:
Lemma 2 Any lot zj such that c0(zj)  pr has no e¤ect on the nal outcome. Thus, it
is without loss to assume that if setting a lot is strictly better for the buyer then all m
lot winners are priced outof the residual market:
c0(zi) > pr; i = 1; :::;m: (3)
Proof. We start by showing that if, in equilibrium, the winner of the smallest lot is
interested in participating in the residual market then the buyers surplus is the same as
if the smallest lot was not o¤ered. Assume there is at least one lot winner, m, who also
trades in the residual market. We have two cases to consider.
i) If the buyer can only set pr after the auction, then the quantity traded in the resid-
ual market by a loser is q0, where U 0
 
Z + (n m)q0 +
m 1X
i=1
[q0   zi]+ + q0   zm
!
=
c0(q0), as, of course, q0 must be larger than zm, for the winner of lot m to participate
in the residual market. Without lot m, the quantity traded in the residual market
by a loser would be q, where U 0
 
Z   zm + (n m+ 1)q +
m 1X
i=1
[q   zi]+
!
= c0(q).
By the monotonicity of supply and demand, it is immediate that q = q0 and, con-
sequently, the two outcomes are the same. By step 1 of the proof of Lemma 1, the
payo¤s will also be unchanged.
ii) If the buyer can commit to pr at the beginning, then we show that for each pr the small
lot makes no di¤erence. If the small lot is o¤ered, the market clearing condition is
pr = c0 (q0) leading to total quantity bought Q0 = Z + (n  m)q0 +
m 1X
i=1
[q0   zi]+ +
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q0   zm, and 0 = prq0   c(q0). If lot m were not o¤ered, we would have pr = c0 (q),
Q = Z   zm + (n  m + 1)q +
m 1X
i=1
[q   zi]+ and  = prq   c(q). It is obvious that
q = q0, Q = Q0 and  = 0.
Therefore, the only way the buyer can hope for a better outcome than the classical
monopsony one is by setting the smallest  and, therefore, each  lot larger than the
residual monopsony quantity for n m+ 1 suppliers: c0(zm)  pr.
The logic of this result is simple: if a lot winner participated (selling an additional
q0 units) in the residual market  joining at least one loser (selling q units)  then, in
equilibrium, marginal costs would equalize, c0(zi + q0) = c0(q) ) zi + q0 = q, leading to
the same outcome as if the lot won had not been o¤ered.
We are now ready to turn to the derivation of the buyers optimal lot+pricing policy.
There are two cases to consider, based on whether the buyer can commit to the residual
market price at the beginning of the game or he is bound to behave sequentially rationally
and therefore not factoring in the e¤ect of pr on the lot prices , given the residual
demand/supply following the lot auctions. As the next lemma shows, both cases lead to
the same optimal number of lots: a single supplier will be left without.
Proposition 1 The buyer strictly prefers to set n  1 identical lots. Consequently, block
sourcing followed by a residual market strictly improves buyer surplus over classic monop-
sony.
Proof. First, since  given Lemma 2  the lot size distribution does not a¤ect the
residual market (which by Lemma 1 determines the prots of all suppliers), the buyer can
appropriate the e¢ ciency gains from equalizing lots while keeping Z constant. Therefore,
identical lots are optimal.
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that settingm < n 1 (identical) lots, z, is optimal.
i) First, let p denote the optimal unit price of the residual demand committed to
at the beginning of the game  leading to the losers producing qL(< z) that satises
c0 (qL) = p. Now, set an additional lot of size qL. It is straightforward to see that, if the
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buyer sets the same price p then there will be no change in the outcome. When n > 2, the
buyer could strictly improve his payo¤ by equalizing the lot sizes as he is able to capture
the e¢ ciency gains. When n = 2, m < n  1 implies no lot to start with and thus there
is no scope for an e¢ ciency gain. In this case, the buyer could strictly improve his payo¤
by marginally decreasing the residual market price from p (but leaving the new lot size at
qL). To see this, note that qL = argmaxU(2q)  2qc0(q), solving the rst-order condition
U 0(2q)  c0(q)  qc00(q) = 0: (4)
In turn, buyer surplus with a lot of size q and residual market price p0 = c0(q0) is U(q +
q0)  c(q) + c(q0)  2q0c0(q0). Then the rst-order condition becomes
U 0(q + q0)  c0(q0)  2q0c00(q0) = 0:
Evaluating its left-hand side at q0 = q, we obtain
U 0(2q)  c0(q)  2qc00(q) < 0;
where the inequality follows from (4). Thus, setting p0 slightly below p would strictly
increase the buyers payo¤.
In conclusion, with full commitment, setting fewer than n  1 lots is suboptimal.
ii) In case the buyer can x the price only after the tendering process, he will choose
the monopsony price at the residual demand, say bp = c0 (bq), where
bq = argmax
q
U (Z + (n m)q)  (n m)c0 (q) q:
He can again set an additional lot of size bq, without changing the outcome. If n > 2, the
buyer could strictly improve his payo¤by equalizing the lot sizes and capture the e¢ ciency
gains. If n = 2, we will now show that setting a lot slightly higher than bq strictly increases
consumer surplus. Buyer surplus given a lot q is U(q+eq(q)) c(q)+c(eq(q)) 2c0(eq(q))eq(q),
leading to the rst-order condition
(1 + eq0(q))U 0(q + eq(q))  c0(q)  eq0(q) [c0(eq(q)) + 2c00(eq(q))eq(q)] = 0:
Evaluating its left-hand side at q = bq and substituting in the rst-order condition for eq(bq)
U 0(bq + eq(bq)) = c0(eq(bq)) + 2c00 (eq(bq)) eq(bq) and eq(bq) = bq, we obtain
U 0(2bq)  c0(bq) = bqc00(bq) > 0:
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Thus, increasing the lot size from bq would strictly benet the buyer.
The fact that the lots need to be equal follows from the fact that the supplier prots
only depend on the aggregate size of the lots (Z) and therefore the buyer can a¤ord to
set lots sizes e¢ ciently. The logic for setting n   1 lots harks back to Lemma 2: If the
buyer sets an additional lot of the same size as the quantity sold by the losing suppliers
in the residual market, the outcome will remain the same. However, the incentives to
set the sizes of the lots and the residual market price do change with this reshu­ ing: In
the case of strong commitment, the buyer will now prefer to further reduce the residual
market price (as it now decreases his residual market purchases by less); while with weak
commitment the buyer will prefer to increase the size of the new lot slightly (as decreasing
his demand in the residual market is less costly than before). This argument works for
any number of lots, including zero, what corresponds to classic monopsony.
The optimal lot size and, of course, the residual market price does depend on the
timing of commitment:
Proposition 2 If the buyer can commit to the price for the residual market before the
lot auction, the optimal price is ps = c0(qs), where the quantity bought from the loser, qs,
and the optimal size of the n  1 lots, zs, uniquely solve
U 0 ((n  1)z + q) = c0(q) + nqc00 (q) ; (5)
U 0 ((n  1)z + q) = c0(z): (6)
Proof. By Proposition 1, we know that there will be n   1 identical lots. Thus, the
buyers objective function is
U ((n  1)z + q)  (n  1) (c(z)  c(q))  nqc0 (q) :
The two rst-order conditions are the ones enunciated in the lemma.
Let us return to our example to illustrate this result.
Example 2 In our two-player linear example with strong commitment the set of equations
becomes
1  z   q = 3q;
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1  z   q = z:
Solving, we obtain qs = 1
7
and zs = 3
7
, leading to total quantity sold Qs = 4
7
> 1
2
= Qm,
residual market price ps = 1
7
< 1
4
= pm, buyer surplus BSs = 2
7
> 1
4
= BSm.
When the buyer has weak commitment power, the lot size determines the price he will
charge in the residual market, making the solution somewhat more involved.
Proposition 3 If the buyer can set the price for the residual market only after the lot
auction, then the optimal price is pw = c0(qw), where the quantity bought from the loser,
qw, and the optimal size of the n  1 lots, zw, uniquely solve
U 0 ((n  1)z + q) = c0(q) + qc00 (q) ; (7)
U 0 ((n  1)z + q) = (n  1)c
0(z) + [c0(q) + nqc00 (q)] @q
@z
n  1 + @q
@z
; (8)
where
@q
@z
=
(n  1)U 00 ((n  1)z + q)
2c00(q) + qc000(q)  U 00 ((n  1)z + q) < 0:
Proof. By Proposition 1, we know that there will be n   1 identical lots. Thus, the
buyers problem is
max
z
U ((n  1)z + q(z))  (n  1) (c(z)  c(q(z)))  nq(z)c0 (q(z))
where q(z) = argmaxq U ((n  1)z + q)   c0(q)q. The rst-order condition for the latter
is (7) and for the former is (8). Fully di¤erentiating (7), we obtain the formula for @q
@z
,
which is negative by our assumptions.
Our example illustrates once again.
Example 3 In our two-player linear example with weak commitment the set of equations
becomes
1  z   q = 2q;
1  z   q = z   q
1  1
3
:
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Solving, we obtain qw = 3
16
and zw = 7
16
, leading to total quantity sold Qw = 10
16
>
4
7
= Qs > Qm, residual market price pw = 3
16
, buyer surplus BSw = 9
32
> 1
4
= BSm.
Obviously, BSw < BSs.
The above propositions have an important implication.
Corollary 1 The buyer will always purchase in the residual market.
Proof. Imagine otherwise. From (5) and (7), q = 0 would imply that the buyer sets the
competitive price in the residual market: U 0 (Z + q) = c0(q). However, by (6) U 0 (Z + q) =
c0(z) so, since c(:) is strictly convex and z > q, we have a contradiction. In case of weak
commitment we can also substitute U 0 (Z + q) = c0(q) into (8) and reach a contradiction.
This result is qualitatively important, as it implies that the buyer will purchase from
every supplier  for example, he will never employ sole-sourcing (c.f. Anton and Yao,
1989) and also that all suppliers make positive prots in equilibrium. Moreover, block
sourcing on its own running an auction, if you will is never optimal.
The logic of this result is based on two observations. First, the prots of suppliers
have zero derivative at zero: 0(q) = d[qc
0(q) c(q)]
dq
= qc00(q). That is, purchasing a small
amount in the residual market increases the suppliers prots by very little. Second, the
marginal value of the last unit to the buyer having bought (n   1)z units  is c0(z),
which is always larger than c0(0). So it is e¢ cient to increase production (via the loser).
We can rank the quantities bought. Welfare, however, cannot be ranked as despite
starting from an ine¢ ciently low quantity  higher production need not imply higher
e¢ ciency, since allocative ine¢ ciency increases as well (c.f. Example 1).
Corollary 2 maxfQm; Qsg < Qw.
Proof. Suppose that Qw  Qs; then by Propositions 2 and 3:
(i) c0(zs) = U 0(Qs)  U 0(Qw) < c0(zw), which implies zs < zw; and
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(ii) c0(qs) + c00(qs)qs < c0(qs) + nc00(qs)qs = U 0(Qs)  U 0(Qw) = c0(qw) + c00(qw)qw,
which implies (given that we have assumed that c000(q)q + 2c00(q) > 0) that qs < qw.
But then Qs = (n   1)zs + qs < Qw = (n   1)zw + qw contradicting the initial
assumption.
Next, suppose that Qw  Qm; then, by the equivalent of (1) and Proposition 3,
c0
 
Qm
n

+ c00
 
Qm
n

Qm
n
= U 0(Qm)  U 0(Qw) = c0(qw) + c00(qw)qw, which implies (given that
we have assumed that c000(q)q + 2c00(q) > 0) that Q
m
n
 qw < zw. But then Qm < Qw =
(n  1)zw + qw, contradicting the initial assumption.
That the weak buyer will buy more than the strong one follows from the fact the he
cannot commit to a low price, so he uses his alternative tool to reduce supplier prots: to
reduce the residual demand. The intuition why the weak buyer will buy more than the
classical monopsonist is that otherwise the residual market quantity would have to be (at
least) as much lower as the decrease in the residual demand but such a drastic decrease
is not optimal at that point.
The quantities bought by the classical and the strong monopsonist cannot be ranked
in general, though the ranking Qm < Qs is more likely. To show this, we rst show
that this ranking is guaranteed for a reasonable family of cost functions: the homogeneous
ones. Afterwards we will display an example where the ranking is the opposite.
Lemma 3 If the cost function c(q) is homogeneous of degree k > 1,11 then Qm < Qs.
Proof. We start by showing that total procurement cost inherits the homogeneity of the
cost function. Assume the cost function c(q) is homogeneous of degree k > 1, c(q) =
kc(q). This leads to a marginal cost homogeneous of degree k 1, c0(q) = k 1c0(q) and
to a second derivative homogeneous of degree k   2, c00(q) = k 2c00(q). Procurement
cost under classical monopsony is
Tm(Qm) = c0

Qm
n

Qm:
11Note that strict convexity of the cost function implies that the degree of homogeneity must exceed 1.
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This function inherits the homogeneity of the cost function: Tm(X) = c0
 
X
n

X =
kc0
 
X
n

X = kTm(X). Procurement cost under strong commitment is
T s(Qs) = (n  1)c

Qs   q(Qs)
n  1

+ c(q(Qs)) + n [c0(q(Qs))q(Qs)  c(q(Qs))] , (9)
where q(X) = argminq

(n  1)c  X q
n 1

+ c(q) + n [c0(q)q   c(q)]	.
Note that q(X) is the solution to nc00(q)q + c0(q)   c0  X q
n 1

= 0, while q(X) solves
nc00(q)q+c0(q) c0  X q
n 1

= 0. Thus, using the homogeneity property of the cost function,
we obtain
nc00(q(X))q(X) + c0(q(X))  c0

X   q(X)
n  1

= k 1

nc00(q)q + c0(q)  c0

X   q
n  1

= 0:
That is, q(X) = q(X).
Then,
T s(X) = (n  1)c

X   q(X)
n  1

+ c(q(X)) + n [c0(q(X))q(X)  c(q(X))] =
= (n  1)c

X   q(X)
n  1

+ c(q(X)) + n [c0(q(X))q(X)  c(q(X))] =
= k

(n  1)c

X   q(X)
n  1

+ c(q(X)) + n [c0(q(X))q(X)  c(q(X))]

= kT s(X):
Next, observe that, by revealed preference, U(Qm) Tm(Qm) > U(Qs) Tm(Qs)
and U(Qs)  T s(Qs) > U(Qm)  T s(Qm). The sum of these inequalities implies
[Tm(Qs)  Tm(Qm)]  [T s(Qs)  T s(Qm)] > 0:
Write Qs in terms of Qm as Qs = Qm. Using the fact that both procurement cost func-
tions are homogeneous of degree k, we obtain [Tm(Qm)  Tm(Qm)] [T s(Qm)  T s(Qm)] =
(k 1) [Tm(Qm)  T s(Qm)] > 0. Now, recall that, by Proposition 1, for any level of pro-
curement X, Tm(X) > T s(X) (the buyer has strictly lower procurement costs when he
sets n  1 lots). Thus, k   1 > 0, which given k > 1 requires  > 1. Consequently,
Qs = Qm > Qm.
Finally, we exhibit an example in which, for some parameter values, Qs < Qm.
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Example 4 Assume there are two suppliers and consider the following utility and cost
functions
U(Q) =

1  Q
2

Q
and
c(q) =
8<: q
2
2
, if 0 < q  q
q2
2
+ m(q q)
2
2
, if q < q:
The classical monopsonist chooses
Qm =
8>><>>:
1+mq
2+m
, if 0 < q < 1
4+m
2q , if 1
4+m
 q  1
4
1
2
, if 1
4
< q
(10)
whereas a buyer that can set a lot chooses
Qs =
8>><>>:
22+3mq
7+3m
, if 0 < q < 1+m
7+5m
4+m+3mq
7+4m
, if 1+m
7+5m
 q  3
7
4
7
, if 3
7
< q
(11)
We obtain the following conclusion: If 1
4
< q < 1
3
and m > 1
2(1 3q) , then Q
s < Qm.
Otherwise, Qm  Qs.
4 Heterogeneous suppliers
In the above analysis we have abstracted away from asymmetry across cost functions. In
this section, we argue that our results are robust to a moderate level of heterogeneity but
large asymmetries render block sourcing ine¤ective.
Let us consider two sellers, with cost functions c1(x) and c2(x) = bc1(x) , with b > 1.
We will restrict attention to the case of the strong buyer, who can commit to the residual
market price before the auction. He can choose three qualitatively di¤erent combinations
of the size of the lot z and the residual market price p:
I. c02(z) < p. Both rms participate in the residual market.
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II. c01(z) < p < c
0
2(z). Firm 1 participates for sure in the residual market, rm 2 only
if it does not win the lot.
III. p < c01(z). Only the loser of the auction participates in the residual market.
Dene q1(p) and q2(p) as the supply function of rm i, derived from p = c0i(qi). For
transparency, we drop the argument of qi when there is no room for confusion.
In (I), both rms bid Bi(z) = pz: In case of winning the auction, their prots are
Bi(z)+p(qi z) ci(qi); when they lose, their prots are pqi ci(qi). Taking the di¤erence,
we see that both rms value winning at pz. Here, lot z is too small to have any real e¤ect
on total quantities and payments: At the end of the day, the buyer obtains quantity
X = q1 + q2 and pays pX, irrespective of which rm wins the auction. Thus, just as in
the homogeneous case, for too small lots our method reproduces the outcome of classic
monopsony.
In (II), the e¢ cient seller must receive at least pz for lot z as above, whereas the
ine¢ cient supplier compares B2(z)   c2(z) and pq2   c2(q2); therefore B2(z)  c2(z) +
pq2   c2(q2). Note that pz < c2(z) + pq2   c2(q2) since
pq2   c2(q2) = max
q
fpq   c2(q)g > pz   c2(z); (12)
since p < c02(z). The e¢ cient rmwins the auction with the bidB1(z) = c2(z)+pq2 c2(q2).
Note that the buyer obtains quantityX = q1+q2 but pays more than in classic monopsony:
B1(z) + p(q1 + q2   z) = c2(z) + pq2   c2(q2) + p(q1 + q2   z) =
= p(q1 + q2) + f[pq2   c2(q2)]  [pz   c2(z)]g > p(q1 + q2);
where the inequality follows by (12). Therefore, setting a lot and a price in this manner is
counter-productive. The reason is that the lot is too big for the ine¢ cient rm, dampening
its valuation of winning the lot and it is the e¢ cient rm who gains the di¤erence.
Finally, in (III), seller i must receive at least ci(z)+ pqi  ci(qi) to be willing to supply
the lot. Note that the e¢ cient rm will value more winning the auction as
c1(z) + pq1   c1(q1) < bc1(z) + pq1   bc1(q1)
= c2(z) + pq1   c2(q1)  c2(z) + pq2   c2(q2);
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where the rst inequality follows from b > 1 and c1(z)   c1(q1) > 0 when q1 < z (what
follows from p < c01(z)); the equality by the denition of c2(:); and the last inequality from
the fact that q2 2 argmaxqfpq c2(q)g. Therefore, the e¢ cient seller wins the auction (and
does not participate in the residual market) with the bid B1(z) = c2(z)+ pq2  c2(q2). As
we have just seen, this lot price is above its cost of production, c1(z), plus its opportunity
cost pq1   c1(q1). In particular, if the buyer set the lot size at z = q1, the e¢ cient rm
would make a prot B1(q1)   c1(q1) > pq1   c1(q1), making the buyer worse o¤ than
under classical monopsony (similarly to (II) above). Of course, z = q1 is not optimal,
but we do have a countervailing e¤ect when setting a lot if sellers are asymmetric: the
e¢ cient sellers extra rents, are to be evaluated against the savings from setting p below
the monopsony price pm.
The following example illustrates this trade-o¤.
Example 5 c1(q) = q2=2, c2(q) = bq2=2, U(Q) = (1 Q=2)Q.
Since only the ine¢ cient rm participates in the residual market, we write q2 = q and
use p = c02(q) = bq. The buyer chooses p and z to maximize
U(z + q)  fB1(z) + pqg =

1  z + q
2

(z + q)  b
2
 
z2 + 3q2

:
We obtain that the optimal lot, residual market price, total consumption are zL = 3
4+3b
,
pL = b
4+3b
 
and qL = 1
4+3b

, QL = zL + qL = 4
4+3b
, respectively. (We are in case (III),
pL < c01(z
L), whenever b < 3). Buyer surplus is BSL = 2
4+3b
.
Let us compare this with the classic monopsony solution: If the buyer sets a price p,
rm 1 produces q1 = p whereas rm 2 produces q2 = p=b; thus the buyer must set price
p = b
1+b
Q to obtain total quantity Q. The buyer chooses Q to maximize
U(Q)  pQ =

1  Q
2

Q  b
1 + b
Q2 =

1  1 + 3b
2(1 + b)
Q

Q:
We obtain Qm = 1+b
1+3b
and BSm = 1+b
2(1+3b)
. Comparing the buyer surpluses, BSL >
BSm () b < 5=3.
When sellers have not too dissimilar productivities, it makes sense to set a lot, followed
by a residual market. When they are very asymmetric, the ine¢ cient rm is a poor
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competitor in the auction for a lot, and the e¢ cient rm can bid much higher than its costs
(production plus opportunity costs) and still win, rendering block sourcing ine¤ective.
5 Conclusions
We have revisited the classic problem of a monopsonist, where the aggregate supply is
constructed from a nite number of producers with diseconomies of scale in production.
We have proposed a (theoretically) novel procurement procedure: to group together part
of the requirements into block contracts and auction them o¤, followed by a residual
market. The buyer optimally will set just one lot less than the number of suppliers.
Importantly, he does not want to reduce the quantity bought from the last supplier to zero
that is, he always wants to buy in the residual market despite this having a negative
e¤ect on the competitiveness of the auction. We have shown that this procurement method
always leads to higher buyer surplus (unless there is excessive cost heterogeneity among
suppliers).
Finally, it is important to note that our two-stage process is qualitatively di¤erent
from other mechanisms where there is also a rst-stage auction followed by additional
interaction (see, for example, Tunca and Wu, 2009). In our case, the second stage involves
the loser, while in the preselection models it is the winners who earn the right to participate
in the nal round.
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